The root zone of the Domain Name System (DNS) has been cryptographically signed using DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).
Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035] . Security extensions to the DNS (DNSSEC) are described in [RFC4033] , [RFC4034] , [RFC4035] , [RFC4509] , [RFC5155] and [RFC5702] .
A discussion of operational practices relating to DNSSEC can be found in [RFC6781] .
In the DNSSEC protocol, resource record sets (RRSets) are signed cryptographically. This means that a response to a query contains signatures that allow the integrity and authenticity of the RRSet to be verified. anchor is outside the DNSSEC protocol, but having one or more trust anchors is required for the DNSSEC protocol to work.
The publication of trust anchors for the root zone of the DNS is an IANA function performed by ICANN. A detailed description of corresponding key management practices can be found in [DPS] , which can be retrieved from the IANA Repository at <https://www.iana.org/ dnssec/>.
This document describes the formats and distribution methods of DNSSEC trust anchors that have been used by IANA for the root zone of the DNS since 2010. Other organizations might have different formats and mechansims for distributing DNSSEC trust anchors for the root zone; however, most operators and software vendors have chosen to rely on the IANA trust anchors.
IMPORTANT NOTE: at the time of this writing, IANA intends to change the formats and distribution methods in the future. If such a change happens, IANA will publish the changes on its web site at <https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files>.
The formats and distribution methods described in this document are a complement to, not a substitute for, the automated DNSSEC trust anchor update protocol described in [RFC5011] . That protocol allows for secure in-band succession of trust anchors when trust has already been established. This document describes one way to establish an initial trust anchor that can be used by [RFC5011] .
Definitions
The term "trust anchor" is used in many different contexts in the security community. Many of the common definitions conflict because they are specific to a specific system, such as just for DNSSEC or just for S/MIME messages.
In cryptographic systems with hierarchical structure, a trust anchor is an authoritative entity for which trust is assumed and not derived. The format of the entity differs in different systems, but the basic idea, that trust is assumed and not derived, is common to all the common uses of the term "trust anchor". The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] . These formats and the semantics associated with each are described in the rest of this section.
Hashes in XML
The XML document contains a set of hashes for the DNSKEY records that can be used to validate the root zone. The hashes are consistent with the defined presentation format of Delegation Signer (DS) resource records from [RFC4034] . The id attribute in the TrustAnchor element is an opaque string that identifies the set of trust anchors. Its value has no particular semantics. Note that the id element in the TrustAnchor element is different than the id element in the KeyDigest element, described below.
XML Syntax
The source attribute in the TrustAnchor element gives information about where to obtain the TrustAnchor container. It is likely to be a URL, and is advisory only.
The Zone element in the TrustAnchor element states to which DNS zone this container applies. The root zone is indicated by a single period (.) character, without any quotation marks. The TrustAnchor element contains one or more KeyDigest elements. Each KeyDigest element represents the digest of a DNSKEY record in the zone defined in the Zone element.
The id attribute in the KeyDigest element is an opaque string that identifies the hash. Its value is used in the file names and URI of the other trust anchor formats. This is described in Section 3.1. For example, if the value of the id attribute in the KeyDigest element is "Kjqmt7v", the URI for the CSR that is associated with this hash will be <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kjqmt7v.csr>. Note that the id element in the KeyDigest element is different than the id element in the TrustAnchor element, described above.
The validFrom and validUntil attributes in the KeyDigest element specify the range of times that the KeyDigest element can be used as a trust anchor. Note that the KeyDigest element is optional; if it is not given, the trust anchor can be used until a KeyDigest element covering the same DNSKEY record but having a validUntil attribute is trusted by the relying party. Relying parties SHOULD NOT use a KeyDigest outside of the time range given in the validFrom and validUntil attributes.
The KeyTag element in the KeyDigest element contains the key tag for the DNSKEY record represented in this KeyDigest.
The Algorithm element in the KeyDigest element contains the signing algorithm identifier for the DNSKEY record represented in this KeyDigest.
The DigestType element in the KeyDigest element contains the digest algorithm identifier for the DNSKEY record represented in this KeyDigest.
The Digest element in the KeyDigest element contains the hexadecimal representation of the hash for the DNSKEY record represented in this KeyDigest.
Converting from XML to DS Records
The display format for the DS record that is the equivalent of a KeyDigest element can be constructed by marshaling the KeyTag, Algorithm, DigestType, and Digest elements. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <TrustAnchor id="AD42165F-B099-4778-8F42-D34A1D41FD93" source="http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml"> <Zone>.</Zone> <KeyDigest id="42" validFrom="2010-07-01T00:00:00-00:00" validUntil="2010-08-01T00:00:00-00:00"> <KeyTag>34291</KeyTag> <Algorithm>5</Algorithm> <DigestType>1</DigestType> <Digest>c8cb3d7fe518835490af8029c23efbce6b6ef3e2</Digest> </KeyDigest> <KeyDigest id="53" validFrom="2010-08-01T00:00:00-00:00"> <KeyTag>12345</KeyTag> <Algorithm>5</Algorithm> <DigestType>1</DigestType> <Digest>a3cf809dbdbc835716ba22bdc370d2efa50f21c7</Digest> </KeyDigest> </TrustAnchor> In this section, all URLs are given using the "https:" scheme. If HTTPS cannot be used, replace the "https:" scheme with "http:". The URL for retrieving the set of hashes described in Section 2.1 is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.
The URL for retrieving the PKIX certificate described in Section 2.2 is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/KEYDIGEST-ID.crt>, with the string "KEYDIGEST-ID" replaced the "id" attribute from the KeyDigest element from the XML file, as described in Section 2.1.2.
The URL for retrieving the CSR described in Section 2.3 is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/KEYDIGEST-ID.csr>, with the string "KEYDIGEST-ID" replaced the "id" attribute from the KeyDigest element from the XML file, as described in Section 2.1.2.
Accepting DNSSEC Trust Anchors
A validator operator can choose whether or not to accept the trust anchors described in this document using whatever policy they want. In order to help validator operators verify the content and origin of trust anchors they receive, IANA uses digital signatures that chain to an ICANN-controlled CA over the trust anchor data.
It is important to note that the ICANN CA is not a DNSSEC trust anchor. Instead, it is an optional mechanism for verifying the content and origin of the XML and certificate trust anchors. It is also important to note that the ICANN CA cannot be used to verify the origin of the trust anchor in the CSR format.
The content and origin of the XML file can be verified using a digital signature on the file. IANA provides a detached CMS [RFC5652] signature that chains to the ICANN CA with the XML file. The URL for a detached CMS signature for the XML file is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.p7s>.
(IANA also provided a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature as a second parallel verification mechanism for the first trust anchor publication, but has indicated that it will not use this parallel mechanism in the future.)
Another method IANA uses to help validator operators verify the content and origin of trust anchors they receive is to use the TLS protocol for distributing the trust anchors. Currently, the CA used for data.iana.org is well-known, that is, one that is a WebTrustaccredited Certificate Authority. If a system retrieving the trust anchors trusts the CA that IANA uses for the "data.iana.org" web server, HTTPS SHOULD be used instead of HTTP in order to have assurance of data origin. Beyond the IANA registry action above, this document makes no other requests and places no further restrictions on IANA.
Security Considerations
This document describes how DNSSEC trust anchors for the root zone of the DNS are published. Many DNSSEC clients will only configure IANAissued trust anchors for the DNS root to perform validation. As a consequence, reliable publication of trust anchors is important.
This document aims to specify carefully the means by which such trust anchors are published, as an aid to the formats and retrieval methods described here being integrated usefully into user environments.
